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SANCTUARY POLICIES: LOCAL RESISTANCE IN 
THE FACE OF STATE ANTI- SANCTUARY 
LEGISLATION 
Azadeh Shahshahani and Amy Pont †  
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the potential for impactful sanctuary policies 
in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina in light of anti-sanctuary and 
anti-immigrant state laws implemented in the past decade and in the wake 
of the 2016 presidential election. The article first reviews changes to im-
migration law which both increased the number of noncitizens subject to 
removal from the United States. The article also reviews the effects of 
anti-sanctuary and anti-immigrant laws on areas such as community 
safety, community-police relations, and state and local civil liability. The 
article then explores the national resistance to both Secure Communities 
and other forms of collaboration between localities and ICE, focusing on 
advocacy efforts that promote sanctuary policies. The article concludes 
by reviewing the most recent federal efforts to counter sanctuary policies, 
and discusses the tools that communities can use to limit local law en-
forcement collaboration with federal enforcement in the current political 
landscape at the state and federal levels. 
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Starting in the 1980s, immigration law in the United States gradually 
transformed through a patchwork of laws which dramatically increased 
the number of noncitizens subject to removal from the United States. This 
patchwork of laws included the War on Drugs and its related legislation.1 
 
 1 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986 gave the U.S. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) (now the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) the power to hold 
noncitizens in local custody for drug offenses. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-570, § 1302, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-41 (1986). 
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Instituted after the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,2 the 
Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and other similar programs allowed for 
the expeditious deportation of any noncitizen convicted of an enumerated 
deportable offense.3 The CAP program fostered collaboration between 
the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) and local authorities, 
enabling INS to utilize state, local, and federal custody as a pipeline for 
the deportation of noncitizens.4 
Throughout the 1990s, Congress continued to pass laws that would 
allow for the deportation of more people by way of contact with the crim-
inal legal system and limit eligibility for relief from removal for nonciti-
zens convicted of certain criminal offenses.5 By far, one of the most 
sweeping and influential pieces of immigration legislation passed in the 
United States was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which expanded the categories of 
qualifying crimes that could subject a noncitizen to deportation.6 In addi-
tion, IIRIRA created the concept of “287(g) agreements,” memoranda of 
agreement which grant local enforcement authorities the power to carry 
out certain federal immigration law enforcement tasks.7 
The landscape of U.S. immigration law again changed in the wake 
of September 11, 2001, as a result of the United States’ increased focus 
on national security and deportations. In 2008, a controversial federal pro-
gram named Secure Communities was created, giving federal immigra-
tion authorities further power to detain individuals with certain criminal 
 
 2 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(1986). 
 3 AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM (CAP) (2013) [hereinafter 
CAP], https://perma.cc/8RL3-AJUH. In 1988, the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program 
(ACAP) and the Institutional Removal Program (IRP) were formed, and then consolidated in 
2006 into CAP. Id. at 2. Deportable offenses are enumerated in the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA). INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(2) (2018). 
 4 See CAP, supra note 3, at 1-2, 4. 
 5 The Immigration Act was signed in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush with the 
stated goal of targeting non-citizens convicted of certain drug offense for removal. George 
Bush: Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 29, 
1990), https://perma.cc/TP2Z-HBZR (“[The Act] meets several objectives of my Administra-
tion’s war on drugs and violent crime. Specifically, it provides for the expeditious deportation 
of aliens who, by their violent criminal acts, forfeit their right to remain in this country.”); see 
also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (1996). For a report dispelling misconceptions of non-citizens as being more prone to 
commit crimes and detailing the law enforcement tactics used against non-citizens suspected 
of having committed crimes, see WALTER A. EWING ET AL., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2015), https://perma.cc/WY5Q-
X4LT. 
 6 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -628 (1996). 
 7 INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018). 
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histories under the auspices of creating safer communities through collab-
oration with local law enforcement.8 
During the 2000s, local law enforcement and federal authorities in-
volved with immigration enforcement implemented programs that facili-
tated cooperation between them. A significant number of state and local 
governments entered into 287(g) agreements with the federal govern-
ment,9 paving the way for local law enforcement to carry out federal im-
migration enforcement work. Starting in 2010, a wave of states began to 
pass laws further aiding federal law enforcement’s efforts to deport 
noncitizens, although courts deemed many provisions were unconstitu-
tional. Among other features, these state laws criminalized applying for 
work without work authorization, penalized failing to register with the 
U.S. government, and criminalized the mere status of being undocu-
mented and present in the United States. Leading this state effort, Arizona 
passed SB 1070.10 Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Indiana, and Utah 
also passed similar laws.11 
In 2011 and 2014, DHS, in a series of memoranda, outlined the pri-
oritization of the deportation of noncitizens with criminal histories.12 In 
2013, the United States deported the highest number of individuals in any 
one year.13 In light of significant opposition to the Secure Communities 
program, ICE replaced the program with the Priority Enforcement Pro-
gram (PEP) in 2014.14 Many of the main tenets of Secure Communities 
 
 8 Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
https://perma.cc/PB5Y-G5YA (last updated Jan. 3, 2018); see also MICHELE WASLIN, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE SECURE COMMUNITIES 
PROGRAM: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND CONTINUING CONCERNS (2011), 
https://perma.cc/9THQ-E7V3. 
 9 See RANDY CAPPS, ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A 
STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 9-12 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/Z7CD-5GW2. 
 10 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 11 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); H.B. 87, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); S.B. 20, 2011-
2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011); H.B. 497, 2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011). 
 12 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Enf’t, et al. (Nov. 20, 2014) [here-
inafter Priority Memo], https://perma.cc/ESB2-P6FV; Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, 
Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
to All Chief Counsel, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (Nov. 17, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/72KN-XRFL. 
 13 See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants 
Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/UZM3-MXYV. 
 14 See Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
https://perma.cc/R6FQ-AVEU (last visited May 15, 2018). 
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were still part of the PEP program, such as the use of detainer requests.15 
Shortly after his inauguration, President Trump signed an executive order 
essentially stating that all immigrants who could be deportable are prior-
ities for deportation.16 In a memorandum implementing the executive or-
der, the DHS restored the Secure Communities program and ended PEP.17 
While certain states were seeking to criminalize the presence of im-
migrants and the federal government was deporting people in increasingly 
larger numbers, localities across the country took the opposite approach 
in support of community safety and family unity. After 2011, many local-
ities adopted what are now referred to as sanctuary policies or trust poli-
cies.18 For simplicity, we will refer to both types of policies as sanctuary 
policies throughout the article. 
The term “sanctuary” as it relates to sanctuary policies, originates 
from the United States in the 1980s when religious institutions protected 
Central American refugees from the threat of deportation.19 At the end of 
the 20th century, Central American refugees fled war-ravaged countries 
such as El Salvador and Guatemala.20 At the time, the Reagan Admin-
istration supported the repressive governments from which the individu-
als were fleeing, and as such, refugees’ asylum claims were not ap-
proved.21 Religious institutions provided legal assistance, food, medical 
care, and employment.22 
Current sanctuary policies are a mixture of legislation, ordinances, 
and policies adopted by states, localities, and sheriffs’ offices across the 
country.23 Sanctuary policies impose varying limitations on cooperation 
 
 15 See id. (delineating that under PEP, detainers could only be issued where an immigra-
tion officer had reason to believe the noncitizen had been convicted of various crimes, rather 
than convicted or merely charged as it was under Secure Communities). 
 16 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“We cannot faith-
fully execute the immigration laws of the United States if we exempt classes or categories of 
removable aliens from potential enforcement.”). The executive order also prioritizes the de-
portation of any removable noncitizens who “[i]n the judgment of an immigration officer, 
otherwise pose a risk to public safety or national security.” Id. at 8,800. 
 17 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/4UZP-UXFT. 
 18 By the end of 2014, almost 300 states or localities implemented some form of sanctuary 
policies, including Santa Clara County, California and Cook County, Illinois. CATHOLIC 
LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., STATES AND LOCALITIES THAT LIMIT COMPLIANCE WITH 
ICE DETAINER REQUESTS (2014) [hereinafter CATHOLIC LEGAL, SANCTUARY POLICIES], 
https://perma.cc/DZA3-ZGK5. 
 19 Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), https://perma.cc/RE7P-4N4S. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See CATHOLIC LEGAL, SANCTUARY POLICIES, supra note 22. 
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with ICE, ranging from prohibiting law enforcement agencies from using 
funds or personnel “to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest 
persons for immigration enforcement purposes”24 to prohibiting the re-
lease of any information regarding a person’s release date or court appear-
ance dates in response to federal inquiries.25 Other sanctuary policies limit 
when a local law enforcement officer or government worker may inquire 
into the immigration status of an individual. As of December 2017, there 
were an estimated 760 counties with at least some form of sanctuary pol-
icy in place.26 However, the 2016 presidential election unleashed a new 
era of anti-immigrant and anti-sanctuary policies, as well as sanctuary 
policies. 
I. ANTI-IMMIGRANT AND ANTI-SANCTUARY STATE LAWS 
The impact of anti-immigrant and anti-sanctuary legislation in Ala-
bama, Georgia, and South Carolina is a key piece of evidence for why 
anti-sanctuary policies and other anti-immigrant legislation are bad pol-
icy. The laws’ impact on states is apparent in community-police relations 
and evidenced by the localities’ exposure to civil liability. Moreover, 
these laws contribute to unconstitutional detention and arrest, discrimina-
tory policing, and decreased trust between communities and local police, 
which are all effects that sanctuary policies seek to prevent. These expe-
riences should not only guide states and Congress away from passing anti-
sanctuary legislation, but also energize community groups to both con-
tinue pushing for sanctuary policies and litigate against the unlawful as-
pects of local law enforcement collaboration with ICE. 
In 2010, Arizona initiated a wave of state-level anti-immigrant laws 
across the country when it enacted S.B. 1070.27 At the time, S.B. 1070 
was among the harshest of anti-immigrant laws enacted in recent history. 
S.B. 1070’s stated goal was to “make attrition [of immigrants] through 
enforcement a top public policy priority of all state and local government 
 
 24 California Values Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a)(1) (West 2018). 
 25 See N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 9-131(f)(9) (2018). 
 26 See KRSNA AVILA ET AL., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., THE RISE OF SANCTUARY: 
GETTING LOCAL OFFICERS OUT OF THE BUSINESS OF DEPORTATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA 9 
(2018) [hereinafter ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY], https://perma.cc/KF2Y-LXKL (reflect-
ing the number of counties that have policies against holding people on ICE detainers). Of the 
3,015 U.S. counties reviewed by the report’s authors, 24% had limits to ICE holds, 6% had 
restrictions on notifications to ICE about individuals’ release dates or other information, 4% 
had limits on ICE access to local jails and or ICE interrogations of individuals, 4% prohibited 
inquiries into immigration status and/or place of birth, and 4% prohibited participation gener-
ally in immigration enforcement. Id. 
 27 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
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agencies in Arizona.”28 The law contained provisions that generally crim-
inalized the presence of undocumented persons.29 In addition, S.B. 1070 
criminalized the employment of undocumented persons and the provision 
of transportation assistance to undocumented persons.30 The law also 
barred localities from limiting their cooperation with ICE.31 Additionally, 
the law authorized local law enforcement officers to ask individuals for 
immigration documents establishing their immigration status during rou-
tine traffic stops – these provisions, known as “show me your papers,” 
stoked fears of racial profiling.32 
After Arizona’s legislature passed S.B. 1070, there were approxi-
mately twenty-four copycat bills up for debate in state legislatures around 
the United States.33 Five states passed copycat anti-immigrant bills, in-
cluding Alabama,34 Georgia,35 and South Carolina.36 Georgia passed its 
Arizona copycat law, H.B. 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and En-
forcement Act, in 2011.37 Alabama followed suit by passing copycat law, 
H.B. 56, in the same year.38 H.B. 56 was heralded as the law that “attacks 
every aspect” of an undocumented person’s life.39 South Carolina passed 
S.B. 20 in 2011, which similarly sought to assert state control over immi-
gration matters.40 In this article, we distinguish between anti-sanctuary 
provisions of state laws and anti-immigrant laws generally. Anti-sanctu-
ary provisions of state laws prohibit localities from taking certain actions 
toward creating and carrying out sanctuary policies and are typically a 
subset of anti-immigrant laws. Anti-immigrant laws generally promote 
cooperation between local law enforcement and ICE or criminalize cer-
tain actions.  
 
 28 Id. at § 1. 
 29 Id. at § 3. 
 30 Id. at §§ 5-7. 
 31 Id. at § 2. 
 32 See Id. 
 33 Arizona’s S.B. 1070, ACLU, https://perma.cc/U85B-A62J (last visited May 18, 2018). 
 34 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011). 
 35 H.B. 87, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011). 
 36 S.B. 20, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011). Indiana and Utah also 
passed copycat legislation. See S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); H.B. 
497, 2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011). 
 37 H.B. 87, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011). 
 38 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011). 
 39 Justin Cox, Alabama Under Siege: The Human Costs of H.B. 56, ACLU (Feb. 27, 2012, 
4:17 PM), https://perma.cc/6SWX-7M2F (statement of Rep. Micky Hammon, who introduced 
the bill, during a debate). 
 40 S.B. 20, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011). 
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A. Case Study: State Legislation Limiting Sanctuary Policies in 
Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina 
The consequences of a law’s anti-sanctuary policies are important to 
note. When states prohibit sanctuary policies and force localities to coop-
erate with ICE on matters such as detainer requests and arrests during 
local law enforcement encounters, they expose themselves to civil liabil-
ity and erode community trust. Additionally, as evidenced in Georgia, a 
state oversight mechanism over anti-immigrant and anti-sanctuary legis-
lation can lead to government overreach and a waste of taxpayer dollars. 
Within their anti-immigrant laws, Alabama, Georgia, and South Car-
olina also enacted anti-sanctuary legislative provisions. The State of Ala-
bama specifically adopted provisions aimed at preventing localities from 
implementing policies which limited cooperation with federal immigra-
tion authorities.41 One provision of Alabama’s H.B. 56 explicitly prevents 
localities from limiting communication with ICE in violation of certain 
federal statutes.42 These federal statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1644, prohibit localities from restricting local officials’ communication 
with federal authorities regarding an individual’s immigration status and 
prohibit government officials from limiting any official’s ability to send 
or receive information from ICE.43 
Alabama’s H.B. 56 further imposed financial penalties in the form 
of limitations on funding to localities deemed non-compliant.44 Further-
more, the law created a private right of action for any U.S. citizen, or 
 
 41 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Ala. 2011). 
 42 Id. H.B. 56 was codified in the Code of Alabama, and the relevant part states, “No 
official or agency of this state or any political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited 
to, an officer of a court of this state, may adopt a policy or practice that limits or restricts the 
enforcement of federal immigration laws by limiting communication between its officers and 
federal immigration officials in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or 8 U.S.C. § 1644, or that re-
stricts its officers in the enforcement of this chapter.” ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(a) (2018). 8 
U.S.C. § 1644 (2018) reads, “[N]o State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in 
any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the [INS] information regarding the 
immigration status, lawful, or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)-
(b) (2018) reads, “[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, 
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, 
the [INS] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of 
any individual . . . . [N]o person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, 
State, or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to information 
regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual: (1) Sending such in-
formation to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the [INS]. (2) Maintaining 
such information. (3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local 
government entity.” 
 43 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2018). 
 44 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Ala. 2011) (“If . . . an official or agency of this 
state or any political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, an officer of a court in 
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noncitizen lawfully present in the state, and a resident of Alabama, to sue 
at the trial court level in Alabama state court under this provision.45 How-
ever, this provision was subsequently amended in 2012 to limit this 
right.46 Now, U.S. citizens and noncitizens lawfully present in the state 
who are residents of Alabama may petition the Attorney General of Ala-
bama or any local district attorneys to bring forth such a lawsuit.47 If a 
judicial finding is made that an official or head of agency violated this 
provision, a court must impose a fine of $1,000 to $5,000 for each day 
that a policy or practice is in place.48 Effectively, this law gives private 
citizens a role in enforcing provisions of the anti-sanctuary law legally,  a 
law which could potentially expose a locality to civil liability.49 
South Carolina’s S.B. 20 similarly limited the localities’ ability to 
pass sanctuary policies. S.B. 20 created a private right of action for citi-
zens to enjoin a locality’s policies that limit or prohibit local law enforce-
ment’s, or other local government employees’ ability to enforce state law 
related to immigration and to communicate with government officials re-
garding a person’s immigration status.50 Additionally, the legislation 
granted courts the permission to impose fines on any locality that the court 
found to be in willful violation of the law.51 
In 2009, prior to the passage of H.B 87 in 2011, the Georgia legisla-
ture amended its statutes to prohibit local governments from implement-
ing sanctuary policies.52 Georgia also created a penalty to withhold fund-
ing from localities found in violation of the law.53 If a locality were to be 
found in violation of the section on sanctuary policies, the locality could 
 
this state, is in violation of this subsection . . . that agency or political subdivision shall not be 
eligible to receive any funds, grants, or appropriations from the State of Alabama until such 
violation has ceased and the Attorney General has so certified.”). 
 45 ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(d) (2011) (amended 2012). 
 46 H.B. 658, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ala. 2012) (amending ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(d) 
(2011)). 
 47 ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(d) (2018). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See discussion infra Section I.A.2. 
 50 S.B. 20, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. § 1 (S.C. 2011). 
 51 Id. 
 52 S.B. 20, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009). The Georgia bill states, “No 
local governing body, whether acting through its governing body or by an initiative, referen-
dum, or any other process, shall enact, adopt, implement, or enforce any sanctuary policy.” Id. 
at § 2. A sanctuary policy is defined in the Georgia code as: “[A]ny regulation, rule, policy, 
or practice adopted by a local governing body which prohibits or restricts local officials or 
employees from communicating or cooperating with federal officials or law enforcement of-
ficers with regard to reporting immigration status information while such local official or em-
ployee is acting within the scope of his or her official duties.” GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-23(a)(6) 
(2017). 
 53 GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-23(c) (2017). 
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lose state funding or state administered federal funding, with some excep-
tions, such as funding related to emergency medical care and certain types 
of disaster relief.54 
In Georgia’s prohibition on sanctuary policies in H.B. 87, Georgia 
also sought to control the exchange of information between ICE and lo-
calities. Georgia law now states that, unless prohibited by federal law, 
state employees “shall not be prohibited from receiving or maintaining 
information relating to the immigration status of any individual or sending 
or exchanging such information with other federal, state, or local govern-
mental entities or employees for official public safety purposes.”55 Fur-
thermore, the provision states that localities should not be prohibited from 
utilizing federal resources such as databases and equipment “related to 
the enforcement of state and federal immigration laws.”56 In 2016, Geor-
gia also passed S.B. 269, which requires that when state agencies provide 
funding to localities certify the localities’ compliance with the state’s anti-
sanctuary law provisions that prohibit limitations on exchange of infor-
mation regarding immigration status and the localities’ use of federal 
sources for immigration enforcement.57 
1. A Limited Number of Local Policies Limiting Collaboration 
with ICE, Exist in Various Locaties in Alabama and Georgia 
A limited number of localities in Alabama and Georgia have imple-
mented sanctuary polices. South Carolina has implemented none.58 How-
ever, there are existing sanctuary policies that could be implemented in 
these states that would not conflict with the anti-sanctuary provisions of 
state laws. Georgia, for example, has seven localities that have chosen to 
limit their cooperation with federal immigration authorities in a way that 
is not in conflict with state law.59 It should be noted that there are a limited 
number of sanctuary policies in these states, despite the fact that the anti-
sanctuary state provisions in Georgia and Alabama do not specifically bar 
localities from refusing to honor voluntary requests to hold individuals 
after their time in local custody has ended. 
 
 54 Id. These exceptions include the following scenarios where verification of lawful pres-
ence is not required in GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-1(d) (2017). 
 55 GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-17(b)(1) (2017). 
 56 Id. at § 35-1-17(b)(3). 
 57 S.B. 269, 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016). 
 58 As of 2014, there are no cities designated as Sanctuary Cities in South Carolina despite 
the fact that the state has a thriving immigrant community. See CATHOLIC LEGAL, SANCTUARY 
POLICIES, supra note 22. See generally AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA (2017), https://perma.cc/KN8Y-D7YK (reporting statistics on South Carolina’s im-
migrant population). 
 59 See discussion infra Section II.A.1. 
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As of the date of publication of this article, Tuskegee was the first 
and only locality in Alabama to limit cooperation with ICE and limit local 
law enforcement’s ability to carry out immigration functions.60 Tuskegee 
passed a resolution that made it improper for law enforcement to discrim-
inate on the basis of race, ethnicity, and immigration status. The Tuskegee 
resolution states: 
[U]nless otherwise provided by the United States Constitution and 
laws of the United States, and/or the laws and constitution of the State of 
Alabama, citizenship, immigration status, national origin, race, ethnicity, 
and the presence of an immigration detainer request, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, notification request, administrative immigration 
warrant, or other civil immigration custody documents should have no 
bearing on an individual’s treatment in police custody (including but not 
limited to classification status, eligibility for work programs, or eligibility 
for pretrial diversion or alternatives to incarceration programs), or on of-
ficials’ decisions to initiate questioning, stops or make arrests.61 
The Birmingham City Council has also adopted a sanctuary city res-
olution; however the resolution does not explicitly address limiting Bir-
mingham’s cooperation with ICE.62 
A number of localities in Georgia have implemented policies that are 
in compliance with the anti-sanctuary provisions of Georgia law. These 
include Fulton, Clayton, DeKalb, Fayette, and Clarke counties, as well as 
the City of Clarkston and the City of Decatur.63 Fulton County Commis-
sioners passed a resolution urging the Fulton County Sheriff to limit co-
operation with ICE by not holding individuals beyond their release dates 
at the expense of Fulton County, not turning over individuals to ICE with-
out a judicial warrant, and not allowing ICE to use county facilities for 
interviews and investigations.64 The sheriff’s offices in Clayton, DeKalb, 
and Clarke counties have implemented policies do not allow for pro-
longed detention of individuals on the sole basis of ICE detainers in order 
to protect those jurisdictions from civil liability. These counties require 
 
 60 Press Release, National Day Laborer Organizing Network, Tuskegee, First City in Al-
abama to Enact an Immigrant TRUST Policy, Reject Entanglement with Immigration Enforce-
ment (May 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/S3QA-58TM. Birmingham, Alabama did pass a reso-
lution naming itself a “Sanctuary City” but did not take any specific steps to do so, such as 
limiting compliance with ICE detainers. See Birmingham City Councilors Approve Sanctuary 
City Resolution, BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/2A8D-KN33 (last visited May 
18, 2018). 
 61 Res. 2015-61, City Council of the City of Tuskagee (2015), https://perma.cc/K6HC-
YVQ6. 
 62 See Birmingham City Councilors Approve Sanctuary City Resolution, supra note 71. 
 63 PROJECT SOUTH ET AL., GEORGIA NON-DETAINER POLICIES, https://perma.cc/2ART-
MYX7. 
 64 Res. 14-0683, Fulton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs (2014), https://perma.cc/3M2B-LLVT. 
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ICE to provide a judicial warrant in order to extend the detention of any 
individual in local custody.65 
Localities in Alabama can adopt similar policies to those in Georgia 
as its state laws do not require local officers to honor ICE detainers and 
hold individuals in local custody for an ICE detainer.66 South Carolina, 
on the other hand, requires that if an officer determines that a person is 
unlawfully present in the United States, that officer: 
[S]hall determine in cooperation with the Illegal Immigration En-
forcement Unit within the South Carolina Department of Public Safety or 
the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as applicable, 
whether the officer shall retain custody of the person for the underlying 
criminal offense for which the person was stopped, detained, investigated, 
or arrested, or whether the Illegal Immigration Enforcement Unit within 
the South Carolina Department of Public Safety or the United States Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement, as applicable, shall assume custody 
of the person.67  
As discussed below, practices like this that require localities to  
honor ICE detainers expose localities to civil liability because such a prac-
tice creates the risk that individuals will be held in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Legal challenges to provisions of this type may be necessary 
to open the door for policies that limit compliance with ICE detainers.68 
2. Cooperation with ICE Detainer Requests Exposes Localities to 
Civil Liability 
Over 760 counties in the United States limit compliance with ICE 
detainers.69 However, as discussed above, South Carolina has no localities 
 
 65 Jeremy Redmon, ICE: Clayton, DeKalb Sheriff’s Officials Limiting Cooperation, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 20, 2017, 2:56 PM), https://perma.cc/AEZ6-V5F5. 
 66 H.B. 658, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ala. 2012) (amending ALA. CODE § 32-6-9(d) 
(2011)). The bill removed the following language: “A verification inquiry, pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1373(c), shall be made within 48 hours to the Law Enforcement Support Center of 
the United States Department of Homeland Security or other office or agency designated for 
that purpose by the federal government. If the person is determined to be an alien unlawfully 
present in the United States, the person shall be considered a flight risk and shall be detained 
until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities.” ALA. CODE § 32-6-
9(d) (2011) (amended 2012). As a result, Alabama removed any state law requiring localities 
to hold an individual pursuant to an ICE detainer. 
 67 S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170(C)(4) (2018). 
 68 A preliminary injunction was initially granted in a legal challenge to this particular 
South Carolina provision, but was later reversed by the same court. United States v. South 
Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898 (D.S.C. 2011), modified, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D.S.C. 2012), 
aff’d, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 69 ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 31, at 9. 
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that limit compliance with ICE detainers, and Alabama has just one local-
ity that limits its compliance with ICE detainers. ICE detainers are a hall-
mark of local law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration au-
thorities. As discussed previously, by honoring ICE detainers, localities 
are agreeing to hold individuals past the period of the individual’s arrest. 
In lawsuits brought against localities that honor detainers, courts around 
the country are finding that holding an individual past that individual’s 
release date from custody in the absence of a judicial warrant is unconsti-
tutional.70 As a result, localities are held liable for having honored detain-
ers. Courts have held that holding an individual beyond the date of release 
could constitute an arrest and is therefore subject to scrutiny under the 
Fourth Amendment, which requires a finding of probable cause for a new 
arrest.71 The First Circuit stated that ICE must have probable cause to is-
sue a detainer request in order to be compliant with the Fourth Amend-
ment because holding someone pursuant to an ICE detainer is a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.72 The Northern District of Illinois found 
that detainers issued in Chicago were unconstitutional because ICE made 
no findings of individuals’ flight risk prior to issuing the detainers.73 The 
 
 70 See, e.g., Santoyo v. United States, No. 5:16-CV-855-OLG, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Tex. 
June 5, 2017) (finding that Plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of 
liability as the locality held the Plaintiff for forty-eight hours pursuant to an ICE detainer 
without probable cause that the Plaintiff had committed a criminal offense); see also Shareef 
Omar, Note, Breaking the Ice: Reforming State and Local Government Compliance with Ice 
Detainer Requests, 40 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 159, 184 (2015) (discussing various settlements, 
ranging from $40,000 - $145,000, between localities and plaintiffs involving detainers). 
 71 In Morales v. Chadbourne, the First Circuit held that holding an individual beyond 
their date of release is an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 
F.3d 208, 217-18 (1st Cir. 2015). In Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, a district court 
in Oregon held that holding an individual who could have been released on bail was a new 
arrest which the enforcement officers did not have lawful authority to make. Miranda-Olivares 
v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9-11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 
2014). Additionally, the court noted that an ICE detainer on its face states only that an inves-
tigation “has been initiated” to determine whether an individual is subject to removal, and so 
does not provide probable cause for an arrest. Id. at 11 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 
U.S. 387, 413 (“Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise 
constitutional concerns.”)). 
 72 Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d at 216-18. 
 73 Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1008-09 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“The bottom 
line is that, because immigration officers make no determination whatsoever that the subject 
of a detainer is likely to escape upon release before a warrant can be obtained, ICE’s issuance 
of detainers that seek to detain individuals without a warrant goes beyond its statutory author-
ity to make warrantless arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).”). Statutory authority for detainers 
is based on 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1226 grants ICE the au-
thority to arrest an individual pending a decision on removability from the United States with 
a warrant issued by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2018). Under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(a)(2), there is the exception to arrest without a judicial warrant if an individual is “en-
tering or attempting to enter the United States” or if an ICE officer has “reason to believe” 
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New York State Office of the Attorney General warned New York local-
ities of the potential exposure to civil liability if they honored ICE de-
tainer requests in the absence of judicial warrants.74 The Office of the At-
torney General cautioned that there are only a few instances where 
cooperation with federal immigraiton law enforcement is reasonable, 
such as where ICE or CBP provides a judicial warrant, there is probable 
cause to believe that the person has illegally reentered the country and 
was previously convicted of a serious criminal offense, or the person has 
engaged in terrorist activity.75 Many localities with sanctuary policies 
limit compliance with ICE detainers by refusing to detain individuals with 
non-serious criminal offenses, therefore avoiding some risk of civil lia-
bility.76 
3. Localities without Sanctuary Policies Carry Out Federal Law 
Enforcement Tasks, yet Remain Uncompensated by the 
Federal Government 
In addition to exposing themselves to civil liability in order to meet 
an increasing number of detainer requests, localities are paying to detain 
additional individuals and using their resources without financial assis-
tance from the federal government.77 As of December 2017, over 114 
counties had policies against using local resources to carry out immigra-
tion enforcement.78 The costs of complying with detainer requests include 
the utilization of local resources and the potential expenses related to law-
suits regarding the unconstitutionality of detainers. In addition, some law 
 
that an individual is in the United States “in violation of any such law or regulation and is 
likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2018). 
 74 N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GEN. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, GUIDANCE CONCERNING LOCAL 
AUTHORITY PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND MODEL SANCTUARY 
PROVISIONS 4-5 (2017), https://perma.cc/SC7D-BN9G. 
 75 See id. at 4, 9-10. 
 76 See CATHOLIC LEGAL, SANCTUARY POLICIES, supra note 22. 
 77 Letter from David Venturella, Assistant Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to 
Miguel Márquez, Cty. Counsel, Cty. of Santa Clara, https://perma.cc/JS36-KL3L; see also 
JUDITH A. GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, THE COST OF RESPONDING TO IMMIGRATION 
DETAINERS IN CALIFORNIA (2012), https://perma.cc/Z94E-BFRS (finding that Los Angeles 
County spends $26 million annually to honor ICE detainers, while California spends a total of 
$65 million annually); EDWARD F. RAMOS, FISCAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF MIAMI-DADE’S 
POLICY ON “IMMIGRATION DETAINERS,” https://perma.cc/FV9Z-GQQF (estimating that Mi-
ami-Dade County spends approximately $12.5 million each year to honor ICE detainers). 
 78 ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 31, at 9. 
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enforcement officials are concerned that taking time away to conduct im-
migration enforcement will reduce the ability of police to complete tasks 
necessary for regular police functions.79 
4. Unlawful and Prolonged Detention During Police Encounters 
Could Be Prevented or Limited Under Sanctuary Policies 
Some of the most concerning provisions of anti-immigrant state laws 
in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina (and antithetical to sanctuary 
policies) were those that authorized local law enforcement officers to re-
quest documents related to an individual’s immigration status, due to the 
attendant risk of law enforcement officers using unlawful and prolonged 
detention in order to obtain such information.80 In Arizona v. United 
States, Justice Anthony Kennedy specifically stated that the “show me 
your papers” provision of the Arizona anti-immigrant law could raise con-
stitutional concerns if state officers were required to hold individuals for 
the sole purpose of obtaining information on an individual’s immigration 
status.81 The Supreme Court was concerned with both unlawful and pro-
longed detention.82 
 
 79 The Police Executive Research Forum, an independent research organization on polic-
ing issues, noted that “[s]pending time and money on immigration enforcement can hinder the 
ability of officers to respond to calls for service, conduct criminal investigations, and perform 
the other duties required by their jobs.” POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, LOCAL POLICE 
PERSPECTIVES ON STATE IMMIGRATION POLICIES 17 (2014), https://perma.cc/3GK3-FFB6. 
 80 Several civil rights organizations, community groups, and the U.S. federal government 
challenged the Arizona law and the copycat laws in other states. The U.S. government’s legal 
challenge to Arizona’s S.B. 1070 reached the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 567 
U.S. 387 (2012). While the Court permanently enjoined several provisions of the Arizona law, 
it allowed the “show me your papers” provision to remain in effect absent indicia of an as-
applied showing that detentions are delayed solely to verify an individual’s immigration sta-
tus. Id. at 413-16. As a result of legal challenges against the laws in Alabama, Georgia, and 
South Carolina, courts similarly blocked several provisions, but not others, such as the “show 
me your papers” provision which remained in effect. See Joint Report Regarding Case Status 
and Disposition at 3, Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(No. 11-14535); Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D.S.C. 2012) (dissolving 
preliminary injunction of certain provisions in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ari-
zona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387), aff’d, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Kim Chan-
dler, Alabama Settles Lawsuit Over Immigration Law, AL.COM (Oct. 29, 2013, 4:13 PM), 
https://perma.cc/ZVY8-R8AZ; Alan Gomez, South Carolina Puts Brakes on Immigration 
Law, USA TODAY (Mar. 3, 2014, 8:32 PM), https://perma.cc/9YDP-XNX8. 
 81 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 413. 
 82 For a more robust discussion of the legal implications of this provision, see 
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE FAULTY 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS BEHIND IMMIGRATION DETAINERS (2013), https://perma.cc/DZ8X-
XMVH. 
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Alabama and South Carolina tacitly accepted that it was clear that 
officers were not allowed to extend traffic stops for the sole purpose of 
investigating an individual’s immigration status.83 Nonetheless, not too 
long after the release of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United 
States, a federal district court in Arizona found that the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office’s (MCSO) use of traffic stops as a pretext to stop indi-
viduals of “Hispanic ancestry or race,” in order to form reasonable suspi-
cion that the individual was in the United States without authorization, 
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause.84 Moreover, the Court noted that MCSO 
was proceeding under the incorrect assumption that being present without 
documents in the United States was a criminal violation of immigration 
law.85 The Court ordered MCSO to permanently stop “using Hispanic an-
cestry or race as [a] factor in making law enforcement decisions pertain-
ing to whether a person is authorized to be in the country.”86 
5. Discriminatory Encounters with Local Law Enforcement and 
Impact on Community Safety 
Sanctuary policies aim to foster trust between local law enforcement 
and immigrant communities. However, when no sanctuary policy exists 
and, instead, local law enforcement inquires into an individual’s immi-
gration status during routine traffic stops, the prospect of discriminatory 
encounters with local law enforcement emerges. Some state law enforce-
ment officials from Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, among others, 
are also concerned with the specter of local police utilizing race as a factor 
to determine “reasonable suspicion” that an individual is undocumented.87 
A report from the Police Executive Research Forum, which gathered law 
enforcement officials from around the country and from states most nota-
bly impacted by the anti-immigrant laws, noted that “[a]lthough the laws 
prohibit using race, color, or ethnicity to make the determination, some 
 
 83 Joint Report Regarding Case Status and Disposition at 3-4, Hispanic Interest Coal. of 
Ala. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-14535) (agreeing that such policy 
would violate the Supremacy Clause); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 471 
(stating that Defendants argued that the law could be interpreted to avoid unconstitutional 
detentions). 
 84 Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’d, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Maricopa County v. Melendres, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016) 
(mem.). 
 85 Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 825. 
 86 Id. at 826. As of January of 2018, the United States government is also challenging a 
number of Maricopa County’s practices. United States v. Maricopa, 151 F. Supp. 3d 998 (D. 
Ariz. 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-17558, 2018 WL 2091242 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 2015) 
(Westlaw). 
 87 See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 91, at 1. 
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police officials worry that the lack of guidance on the reasonable suspi-
cion standard leaves officers little choice but to assume that people they 
encounter may be in the United States illegally.”88 
While there is no exact data available on the effects of the anti-im-
migrant laws across Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, studies and 
anecdotal evidence shed light on the impact of these policies on commu-
nities and safety. A 2012 phone study of Latinos’ perspectives on coop-
eration with law enforcement in Cook County, Illinois, Harris County, 
Texas, Los Angeles, California, and Maricopa County, Arizona found 
that 70% of undocumented immigrants surveyed said that they were less 
likely to contact law enforcement authorities if they were a victim of a 
crime given local law enforcement’s increased role in federal immigration 
enforcement.89 Additionally, 28% of U.S.-born Latinos surveyed were 
concerned about the safety of those they knew who were undocumented 
and, therefore, feared reporting crimes to the police.90 The survey re-
spondents shared concerns that individuals who committed crimes were 
moving into their neighborhoods with the knowledge that their crimes 
would not be reported.91 
Testimonials of individuals’ interactions with Georgia’s police pro-
vided examples of individuals trying to seek the police’s help but either 
encountering roadblocks or feeling that the police unlawfully detained 
them rather than investigating the reported crime.92 In Georgia, people of 
color were disproportionately affected by increasing cooperation between 
ICE and local law enforcement, and the disparity increased over time. In 
DHS’s Fiscal Year 2013, 96.4% of individuals subject to ICE detainers 
were defined by ICE as having dark or medium complexion as compared 
to 66.7% in Fiscal Year 2007.93 
Community policing is a policing practice that includes community 
involvement and consultation, decentralization, and increased officer dis-
cretion, in order to increase community participation in problem solving 
and enhance the legitimacy of the police within the community.94 Many 
 
 88 Id. at 17-18. 
 89 NIK THEODORE, DEP’T OF URBAN PLANNING & POLICY, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., INSECURE 
COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT, at i (2013), https://perma.cc/HQ56-RFWS. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at ii. 
 92 See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA. ET AL., PREJUDICE, POLICING AND 
PUBLIC SAFETY: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION HYPER-ENFORCEMENT IN THE STATE OF 
GEORGIA 9, 11 (2014) [hereinafter ACLU, PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY], 
https://perma.cc/2XW6-CPCU. 
 93 Id. at 14. 
 94 Community Policing and Procedural Justice, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POL’Y, 
https://perma.cc/9XQC-UE5N (last visited May 15, 2018). 
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local law enforcement officials are concerned with the entanglement be-
tween local police and federal immigration authorities because of the neg-
ative impact on community policing practices and community safety. In 
2015, the Chief of the Salt Lake City Utah Police stated, “[r]equiring po-
lice to enforce federal immigration law undermines the trust and cooper-
ation of immigrant communities, which are essential elements of commu-
nity oriented policing.”95 
In 2014, the Police Executive Research Forum released a report, Lo-
cal Police Perspectives on State Immigration Policies, after convening 
police and law enforcement officials from Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Georgia, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia to discuss the impact of state 
immigration laws on local law enforcement agencies.96 In this report, of-
ficials noted that the anti-immigrant laws have led localities to adopt pol-
icies that go against “public safety and community policing priorities.”97 
The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing highlighted the im-
portance of having laws, policies, and practices that do not interfere with 
the ability of local law enforcement to build strong relationships with lo-
cal communities.98 
6. Georgia’s Anti-Sanctuary Policy Oversight Mechanism: 
Lacking Checks-and-Balances and Procedural Due Process 
Protections, While Wasting Taxpayer Dollars 
As part of its campaign to prevent and eliminate sanctuary policies, 
the state of Georgia created a separate regulatory agency purposed with 
coercing compliance with the state’s anti-sanctuary laws.99 The Immigra-
tion Enforcement Review Board (“IERB” or “Board”) is a quasi-judicial 
body designed solely to receive and review complaints about violations 
 
 95 Lee Davidson, Two Utah Top Cops Oppose Making Local Police Immigration Agents, 
SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 6, 2015, 8:52 AM), https://perma.cc/RD6V-T6KD (statement of Salt 
Lake City Interim Police Chief Mike Brown); see TASKFORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES, 
HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2011), https://perma.cc/K2UX-3GXS (“When communities perceive 
that police are enforcing federal immigration laws, especially if there is a perception that such 
enforcement is targeting minor offenders, that trust is broken in some communities, and vic-
tims, witnesses and other residents may become fearful of reporting crime or approaching the 
police to exchange information.”). 
 96 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 91, at iv. 
 97 Id. at 26 (discussing Arizona’s S.B. 1070, but noting that perspectives varied regarding 
its impact). 
 98 See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 18 (2015), https://perma.cc/L6DV-
H4QB (“It is the view of this task force that whenever possible, state and local law enforce-
ment should not be involved in immigration enforcement.”). 
 99 See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-3(b) (2017). 
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of Georgia’s anti-sanctuary law and violations of other anti-immigrant 
laws.100 Where an agency or official is found to be in violation, the IERB 
has the authority to impose sanctions.101 
The IERB has authority to hear complaints concerning public agen-
cies or employees “alleged to have violated or failed to properly enforce 
[Georgia’s anti-sanctuary laws].”102 Any resident of Georgia,103 who is 
also a registered voter, may submit a complaint.104 Complainants do not 
need to show that they have been injured by an agency’s or an officer’s 
failure to comply — essentially, complainants do not need to show stand-
ing to invoke the process of the Board. 
Several of the IERB’s characteristics are noteworthy. The IERB is 
composed of seven members, three members appointed by the state’s 
Governor, two members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, and two 
members appointed by the Speaker of the House.105 This is noteworthy 
because these positions are currently held by state officials who have long 
supported anti-immigrant legislation and put forth anti-immigrant state-
ments in Georgia.106 The IERB is empowered to operate as a tribunal by 
engaging in trial-like proceedings to investigate and adjudicate com-
plaints, even going so far as to hear appeals of initial decisions made by 
its own members.107 It may also promulgate its own rules.108 The most 
troubling aspects of the IERB are the processes by which it hears com-
plaints, its power to sanction public agencies and officials, and the lack of 
oversight and control that may be imposed on its members and actions. 
The Board’s complaint process is deficient because it lacks oversight 
and due process procedures that are present in other forms of administra-
tive hearings. The statutory mandate for the IERB neither provides for 
 
 100 § 50-36-3(e). 
 101 § 50-36-3(g)–(h). 
 102 § 50-36-3(e). 
 103 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2-1(9) (2017) (“‘Resident’ means a person who has a permanent 
home or domicile in Georgia and to which, having been absent, he or she has the intention of 
returning.”). 
 104 § 50-36-3(e). 
 105 § 50-36-3(b). 
 106 See, e.g., Jeff Gill, Ralston Discusses Redistricting, HOPE, Immigration, GAINESVILLE 
TIMES (May 31, 2011, 10:33 PM), https://perma.cc/SPQ6-V7ME; Jeremy Redmon, Deal 
Signs Bill Expanding Immigration Crackdown, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 25, 2013, 10:13 
AM), https://perma.cc/MM78-4D4S; Dan Whisenhunt, Lt. Governor Casey Cagle Escalates 
Fight with Decatur Using State Immigration Board, DECATURISH (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/XY2F-A4FE. 
 107 § 50-36-3(i). 
 108 § 50-36-3(d)(3). 
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oversight over its decisions, nor a process resembling procedural due pro-
cess.109 For one thing, there is no independent state body overseeing the 
actions of the IERB. As such, the IERB can act, and so far has acted, with 
impunity.110 
The sanctions that the IERB may impose are severe and may be det-
rimental to a public agency’s ability to function. Possible sanctions in-
clude “revocation of qualified local government status, loss of state ap-
propriated funds, and a monetary fine of not less than $1,000.00 or more 
than $5,000.00.”111 The failure to comply with remedial action also au-
thorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil mandamus action against 
the agency or employee in order to enforce compliance with the law and 
the Board’s recommendations.112 These measures that could be particu-
larly damaging for small localities leave public agencies and employees 
with little choice but to comply. 
Since its adoption, the IERB has engaged in gross overreach.113 The 
IERB has also proven that it is willing to go beyond even its own rules’ 
limitations by investigating claims that are insufficiently pled. According 
to the complaint process rules set by the IERB, a complaint must contain 
“sufficient facts concerning the alleged violation . . . including a date or 
range of dates in which this violation or failure to enforce allegedly oc-
curred, to determine if a prima facie case exists for finding a violation or 
failure to enforce.”114 The IERB failed to enforce this provision in 2012 
when it considered a complaint filed by Michael Dale Smith. Smith’s 
complaint alleged that the city of Vidalia was a sanctuary city.115 The 
Board expressed concern over the lack of information alleged in Smith’s 
 
 109 See § 50-36-3; see also GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 291–2–.01 to 291–2–.05 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/A37K-QKK7 (IERB complaint, hearing, and appeals regulations). 
 110 Also, in a recent meeting where Lieutenant Governor Casey Cagle filed a complaint 
against the City of Decatur, an IERB member who had made statements to the media about 
the City of Decatur policy ahead of the hearing refused to recuse himself. State Immigration 
Board Will Hear Complaint Against City of Decatur in January, DECATURISH (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/VDH9-EQ82. He finally stepped down from the investigation after the city 
filed a complaint. http://decaturish.com/2018/03/immigration-board-member-who-called-lt-
gov-cagle-a-winner-abstains-from-decatur-case/ 
 111 § 50-36-3(h). 
 112 § 50-36-3(j). 
 113 See, e.g., Jeremy Redmon, Georgia’s Immigration Enforcement Panel Draws Scrutiny, 
POLITICALLY GA. (Oct. 23, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://perma.cc/A3RV-FPXB (explaining that 
nearly all of the 20 complaints since 2011 came from one individual with a known animus 
towards immigrant communities and that the IERB’s lack of activity with filed complaints is 
evidence that its actions are not within the state’s purview). 
 114 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 291–2–.01(3)(c) (2018) (emphasis in original). 
 115 See Orlando Montoya, Officials Probe Immigration in Vidalia, GA. PUB. 
BROADCASTING (July 2, 2012, 11:50 AM), https://perma.cc/K2QB-HLSK. 
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complaint116 given the absence of specific names, dates, and locations in 
the complaint, beyond the naming of the period from 2006-2012, to sup-
port the allegations.117 However, instead of dismissing the complaint for 
a failure to establish sufficient facts, the Board voted unanimously to cre-
ate a review panel and investigate Smith’s allegations, a demonstration of 
the Board’s gross overreach.118 The unanimous approval of such a poorly 
supported complaint demonstrates both the Board’s willingness to depart 
from its own rules and its lack of regard for public entities’ limited time 
and resources. Ultimately, after finding nothing actionable, the Board de-
cided to dismiss the complaint.119 However, the mere fact that the Board 
acted on the complaint, despite its substantive misgivings, shows the po-
tential for abuse of power. 
Associated with the overreach and checks-and-balance issues that 
are plaguing the IERB’s proceedings is its cost to Georgia’s taxpayers. 
Although IERB members are unpaid, “expenses incurred in connection 
with the investigation and review of complaints . . . .” must still be reim-
bursed through the state government’s appropriations.120 In 2015, Georgia 
appropriated $20,000 to the IERB.121 However, appropriations are only a 
fraction of the actual expenses incurred by all parties involved in com-
plaint proceedings. Even if a complaint is not factually sufficient on its 
face, public agencies must still waste time and taxpayer money in re-
sponding to IERB investigations and defending against allegations by ob-
taining counsel.122 The cost for state agencies to comply with IERB in-
vestigations and pay sanctions is likely an acutely felt waste of taxpayer 
dollars. 
Its habit of overreach, its unchecked power, and the resulting wasted 
resources liken the IERB’s proceedings to those of the Salem witch trials; 
localities are being targeted because of animus toward immigrants.123 
 
 116 See Jeremy Redmon, Panel to Probe Immigration-Related Complaint Against Vidalia, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (June 29, 2012, 4:51 PM), https://perma.cc/SWL5-7ALQ. 
 117 Azadeh Shahshahani, Unchecked Power Granted by House Bill 87, JURIST (Aug. 10, 
2012, 1:00 AM), https://perma.cc/42N3-2BAQ. 
 118 See Redmon, Panel to Probe Immigration-Related Complaint Against Vidalia, supra 
note 130. 
 119 Associated Press, Immigration Panel Dismisses Complaint, GA. PUB. BROADCASTING 
(Sept. 20, 2012, 2:45 PM), https://perma.cc/BH5J-SJ3H. 
 120 GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-3(c) (2017). 
 121 H.B. 76, 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ga. 2015). 
 122 See Edgar Treiguts, Immigration Panel Stirs Controversy, GA. PUB. BROADCASTING 
(Sept. 11, 2011, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/KP8U-TMN9 (“If a complaint is filed against 
you, even if it has no merit, you still have to waste time and money that a lot of counties don’t 
have.”). (statement of Karen Weinstock, immigration attorney with the Atlanta firm Siskind 
Susser). 
 123 An article from the Atlanta Journal Constitution is revealing. Redmon, Georgia’s Im-
migration Enforcement Panel Draws Scrutiny, supra note 127 (“Over the next six years the 
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II. LOCAL RESISTANCE TO SECURE COMMUNITIES AND RELATED 
PROGRAMS 
Immigrant communities not only face unfriendly state policies, but 
are subjected to harsh federal policies as well. Despite these policies, 
many local communities, in addition to state governments and localities, 
have met the challenge with strong opposition. This opposition mainly 
comes in the form of sanctuary polices that are compliant with anti-sanc-
tuary state legislation. The following is a discussion of some federal anti-
immigrant policies adopted and discarded over the last ten years, and the 
effective opposition toward those policies on the state and local level. 
 
A. Local Policies Passed in Opposition to Secure Communities and 
“287(g) Agreements” 
 
Sanctuary policies have been a key part of the resistance to recent 
federal anti-immigrant policies. The first of these recent policies was Se-
cure Communities, which was launched by ICE in 2008.124 Secure Com-
munities is an effort to prioritize the removal of noncitizens who were 
arrested and/or violated criminal laws. To function, Secure Communities 
relies on fingerprint-based biometric data gathered by the FBI from ar-
rests and bookings made by state and local authorities.125 The FBI shares 
the fingerprints with ICE, and ICE checks the fingerprints against its rec-
ords to determine the immigration status of individuals.126 Under Secure 
Communities, when fingerprints collected by state and local law enforce-
ment match individuals who could be deportable, ICE then issues a de-
tainer requesting the authorities at the state or local jail to continue hold-
ing the individual for up to forty-eight hours, excluding holidays and 
weekends.127 The requested time allows ICE to interview the individual 
and decide whether to seek the individual’s removal from the United 
States.128 
Many localities met ICE’s Secure Communities initiative with re-
sistance and enacted sanctuary policies to mitigate its deleterious effects. 
 
Immigration Enforcement Review Board received 20 complaints to investigate, according to 
documents obtained through Georgia’s Open Records Act. And all but one came from the 
same person: D.A. King, a longtime anti-immigration activist from Marietta.”). 
 124 See Overview, Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
https://perma.cc/Q9Y3-NL4Z (last visited May 18, 2018). 
 125 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE 
COMMUNITIES: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 3-5 [hereinafter SECURE COMMUNITIES: 
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES], https://perma.cc/9J7X-4HA4. 
 126 See id. 
 127 See id. 
 128 See id. at 8. 
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Secure Communities purportedly didn’t impose “new or additional re-
quirements” on state and local law enforcement agencies.129 However, 
many jurisdictions were opposed to the additional cost of complying with 
detainers and the constitutional concerns over holding individuals without 
a warrant or probable cause. As of December 2016, 612 counties, and 3 
states, had adopted policies that limited cooperation with ICE on detainers 
in some way.130 As of December 2017, more than 760 counties and five 
states had adopted policies that limit cooperation with ICE in some 
way.131 Localities adopted policies in the form of police and sheriff’s de-
partment policies, executive orders, jail policies, ordinances, and resolu-
tions.132 Two states, California and Connecticut, also passed TRUST 
Acts, which set statewide restrictions on cooperation with ICE detain-
ers.133 This outcry led ICE to replace Secure Communities.134 
The 287(g) program was passed as a part of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996.135 This program promotes state 
and local law officials’ collaboration with federal immigration laws by 
allowing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enter into Mem-
oranda of Agreements (MOAs) with local and state entities.136 These 
MOAs essentially establish that state and local police officers can perform 
certain functions of federal immigration agents, including issuing detain-
ers, interviewing individuals about their immigration status, and transfer-
ring noncitizens into ICE custody.137 However, MOAs can be terminated 
at any time by either DHS or the local law enforcement agency.138 Also, 
once the MOA expires, DHS is not legally obligated to renew it.139 Major 
 
 129 Process, Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
https://perma.cc/Q9Y3-NL4Z (last visited May 18, 2018). 
 130 See LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., SEARCHING FOR 
SANCTUARY: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH 
DEPORTATIONS 12 (2016), https://perma.cc/FC6W-38D7 (showing that brackets three through 
seven include the 612 counties that limit cooperation with ICE). 
 131 ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 31, at 11, 20. 
 132 For a comprehensive compilation of these local policies, see Detainer Policies, 
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/QB2D-Z2J9. 
 133 Sam Dorman, DHS Designates California and Connecticut as Sanctuary States, WASH. 
FREE BEACON (Mar. 31, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://perma.cc/6969-JL2U. 
 134 See discussion supra INTRODUCTION; Jeremy Redmon, Immigration Enforcement Pro-
gram to Be Replaced in Jails Nationwide, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 14, 2014, 5:00 PM), 
https://perma.cc/4RFB-8DEJ. 
 135 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563, to -564 (1996); INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(g). 
 136 AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE 287(G) PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/ZB89-4TV3. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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complaints regarding the 287(g) program include that these programs are 
expensive for state and local agencies and have resulted in racial profil-
ing.140 
1. Case Study: Georgia Localities’ Efforts to Enhance 
Community Trust and Safety 
Despite widespread resistance in other states, the response in Geor-
gia was grossly disproportionate to the effect of Secure Communities in 
the state. Of the 381,406 individuals deported through Secure Communi-
ties since its implementation in 2008, 12,525 were living in Georgia.141 It 
was not until years after the adoption of Secure Communities that Georgia 
localities began to show opposition to the program. 
Seven Georgia localities showed resistance to ICE detainers. Three 
of the counties, Fulton, Clayton, and DeKalb, are concentrated in Atlanta 
and the surrounding area.142 In September 2014, Fulton County became 
the first Georgia locality to issue a policy of noncompliance in regards to 
Secure Communities.143 Fulton County commissioners issued a resolution 
to urge the sheriff’s office to limit compliance with ICE’s voluntary de-
tainers requests and ICE requests generally.144 The resolution urged the 
sheriff’s office to decline ICE requests for access to individuals and for 
use of Fulton County facilities, and to prohibit county employees from 
communicating with ICE about the incarceration or release status of indi-
viduals while on duty, unless the federal government agrees to reimburse 
Fulton County for the cost of compliance, ICE agents have a “criminal 
warrant” (that meets the standard of probable cause), or the county has “a 
legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not related to the enforcement 
of immigration law.”145 
DeKalb County and Clayton County soon followed suit.146 Clayton 
County and DeKalb County’s policies of limited compliance came di-
rectly from their sheriffs’ offices.147 In November 2014, the Clayton 
County Sheriff’s office sent an email stating that the office would no 
 
 140 Id. at 4-8. 
 141 Redmon, Immigration Enforcement Program to Be Replaced in Jails Nationwide, su-
pra note 152. 
 142 See Jeremy Redmon & Greg Bluestein, Georgia Cities Limiting Cooperation with ICE 
Amid Trump’s Crackdown, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 12, 2017, 6:39 PM), 
https://perma.cc/D3JE-W96E. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See Res. 14-0683, Fulton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs (2014), https://perma.cc/3M2B-LLVT. 
 145 Id. at 2. 
 146 Redmon, Immigration Enforcement Program to Be Replaced in Jails Nationwide, su-
pra note 152. 
 147 See Redmon & Bluestein, Georgia Cities Limiting Cooperation with ICE Amid 
Trump’s Crackdown, supra note 162. 
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longer detain or extend the detention of anyone at the request of ICE un-
less ICE presented the sheriff’s office with a judicially issued warrant au-
thorizing the detention.148 In December 2014, DeKalb County’s Sheriff’s 
office also released a memorandum outlining its refusal to honor ICE re-
quests to extend the detention of released DeKalb County jail inmates 
without a warrant or other sufficient probable cause.149 Other localities in 
Georgia, namely Fayette County, Clarke County, the City of Clarkston, 
and the City of Decatur, also followed suit.150 Studies have shown that 
counties with sanctuary policies have lower crimes rates and stronger 
economies than nonsanctuary counties.151 
In contrast to the policies adopted by these seven localities to limit 
their collaboration with ICE, four other Georgia counties, Cobb,152 Gwin-
nett,153 Hall,154 and Whitfield,155 maintained 287(g) agreements.156 The 
287(g) program allows ICE to partner with local law enforcement agen-
cies and delegate some of their immigration enforcement functions.157 
Governor Nathan Deal encouraged the formation of 287(g) partnerships 
in an attempt to allay fears of the cost of enforcing HB 87.158 In reality, 
the federal government agreed to pay the cost of training local law en-
 
 148 Jeremy Redmon, Clayton County Sheriff’s Office Stops Complying with ICE Detainers, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 19, 2014, 12:23 PM), https://perma.cc/Z53D-MNHJ. 
 149 Press Release, Jeffrey L. Mann, Sheriff, DeKalb Cty. Sheriff’s Office, DeKalb Sheriff 
Will Not Hold Released Inmates for Immigrations and Customs Without Warrants (Dec. 4, 
2014), https://perma.cc/V6NN-NMFQ. 
 150 See PROJECT SOUTH ET AL., GEORGIA NON-DETAINER POLICIES, supra note 74. 
 151 “The data are clear: Crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties com-
pared to nonsanctuary counties. Moreover, economies are stronger in sanctuary counties—
from higher median household income, less poverty, and less reliance on public assistance to 
higher labor force participation, higher employment-to-population ratios, and lower unem-
ployment.” TOM K. WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., THE 
EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES ON CRIME AND THE ECONOMY 1 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/X398-QE3R. 
 152 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Cobb Cty. 
Bd. of Comm’rs, & Cobb Cty. Sheriff [hereinafter Cobb 287(g)], https://perma.cc/YB9D-
QSME. 
 153 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t & Gwinnett 
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t [hereinafter Gwinnett 287(g)], https://perma.cc/SD8L-LQ37. 
 154 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t & Hall Cty. 
Sheriff’s Office [hereinafter Hall 287(g)], https://perma.cc/4SGA-F4VJ. 
 155 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t & Whitfield 
Cty. Sheriff’s Office [hereinafter Whitfield 287(g)], https://perma.cc/8GVL-JVHZ. 
 156 INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018). 
 157 Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration & Nationality Act, 
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://perma.cc/U72B-BL2D (last visited May 15, 
2018). 
 158 See Jeanne Bonner, Who Will Pay for New Immigration Law?, GA. PUB. 
BROADCASTING (May 26, 2011, 2:27 AM), https://perma.cc/Z7BM-CQUL. 
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forcement in immigration enforcement through 287(g) partnerships; how-
ever, with the exception of providing technology in some instances, it 
does not cover the cost of enforcement itself.159 In Gwinnett County, 
Sheriff Butch Conway credited 287(g) with decreasing the crime rate and 
the prison population.160 Immigrant rights activists dispute that claim by 
arguing that 287(g) merely discouraged undocumented immigrants from 
reporting crime.161 The true cost of 287(g) has been the loss of trust be-
tween law enforcement and the immigrant community.162 Referred to as 
a “successful force multiplier,” 287(g) agreements have made a comeback 
under the Trump administration.163 
Both Secure Communities and 287(g) have had a devastating effect 
on communities in Georgia. The local law enforcement in Georgia volun-
tarily turned over more than 54,000 individuals to ICE between 2007 and 
June 2013.164 The number of detainers that ICE issued between 2007 and 
2013 grew by 17,169%, indicating the increased cooperation between 
ICE and local law enforcement.165 Perhaps the most insidious effect of the 
cooperation has been the increased reliance on racial profiling by local 
law enforcement.166 The overwhelming majority of detainers issued in 
Georgia were for persons of Latin American origin.167 Specifically, 
97.7% of ICE arrests and 96% of ICE detainers from 2007 to 2013 tar-
geted individuals with medium or dark complexions.168 U.S. citizens have 
also been caught up in the frenzy of racial profiling created by the collab-
oration, as 48 of the 54 ICE detainers issued for U.S. citizens targeted 
persons of medium to dark complexion.169 
 
 159 See Cobb 287(g), supra note 172, at 5-6; Gwinnett 287(g), supra note 173, at 5-6; Hall 
287(g), supra note 174, at 5-6; Whitfield 287(g), supra note 175, at 5-6. 
 160 Tyler Estep, Sherriff: Jail’s Dropping Population Due to Controversial Immigration 
Program, GWINNETT DAILY POST (Jan. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/7BLK-KDQV. 
 161 See id. 
 162 See generally ACLU, PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 106. 
 163 See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/4UZP-UXFT. 
 164 ACLU, PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 106, at 10. 
 165 Id. at 10-11. 
 166 Id. at 12-14. 
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B. Changes to Secure Communities 
ICE responded to nationwide criticism of Secure Communities by 
retiring the program and replacing it with the Priorities Enforcement Pro-
gram (“PEP”).170 The showing of probable cause under PEP did not sat-
isfy the requirements of policies that were put into place by resistant lo-
calities. As a doctrine, probable cause originates in the Fourth 
Amendment.171 Probable cause consists of “facts and circumstances 
within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent per-
son, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, under the circumstances 
shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to com-
mit an offense.”172 
However, the showing of probable cause on the detainer form under 
the now defunct PEP could consist of a final order of removal, pendency 
of removal proceedings, biometric match that reflects no lawful status or 
removability, statements made by the individual to an immigration of-
ficer, and/or other reliable evidence.173 None of the items listed here indi-
cate an offense under state law. Instead, all the items relate to the enforce-
ment of immigration law. None of the listed items amount to a judicial 
warrant and, thus, would fall short of a policy such as that present in Clay-
ton County, Georgia.174 All the listed items would also fall short of a pol-
icy such as that urged by commissioners in Fulton County, Georgia, re-
quiring a warrant or a “legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not 
related to the enforcement of immigration law.”175 Furthermore, none of 
the listed items would satisfy California’s TRUST Act,176 and only a final 
order of removal would satisfy Connecticut’s TRUST Act.177 
This change was short lived as Secure Communities was revived by 
the Trump Administration following the November 2016 presidential 
election. On January 25, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order 
that dealt with immigration enforcement.178 On February 20, 2017, then-
DHS Secretary, John Kelly, signed two implementation memoranda 
 
 170 See Priority Enforcement Program, supra note 18. 
 171 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”). 
 172 United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 173 OFFICE OF ENF’T & REMOVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
PRIORITY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 2, https://perma.cc/5D79-V6TL. 
 174 See Redmon, Clayton County Sheriff’s Office Stops Complying with ICE Detainers, 
supra note 168. 
 175 Res. 14-0683, Fulton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/3M2B-LLVT. 
 176 See California Values Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a)(1) (West 2018). 
 177 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h(b) (2018). 
 178 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
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which sought to carry out these policies.179 In one of the implementation 
memorandum, entitled “Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve 
the National Interest”, Secretary Kelly ended the PEP program and re-
vived the largely discredited Secure Communities program.180 Federal 
Courts have been skeptical about the constitutionality of ICE detainers.181 
With the reintroduction of Secure Communities, the same issues 
which plagued the prior administration will be present once again as the 
ineffective changes made to Secure Communities from the implementa-
tion of PEP would no longer be existent. These issues include the erosion 
in community trust and, accordingly, a reduction in community safety. 
III.  THREATS TO SANCTUARY POLICIES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
Pending and recently proposed legislation at the national level 
demonstrates traction in terms of federal efforts to eliminate sanctuary 
policies. Similar to the anti-sanctuary provisions adopted within anti-im-
migrant laws, these policies seek to eradicate sanctuary provisions by 
eliminating localities’ rights to determine: when and with whom to share 
information, and when to honor ICE’s detainer requests. Nevertheless, 
since many legal challenges to federal and state anti-sanctuary policies 
exist and have recently been successful, community groups should remain 
encouraged to be active in pushing for more sanctuary policies. 
A. Executive Branch Efforts to Defund Sanctuary Cities Before and 
After the November 2016 Presidential Election 
Both prior to and after the November 2016 presidential election, the 
Executive Branch has taken steps to assess its power to limit sanctuary 
policies. In 2016, a memorandum from the U.S. Inspector General con-
cluded that sanctuary policies could violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373,182 a federal 
statute prohibiting local and state governments from enacting laws or pol-
icies that limit communications regarding the immigration or citizenship 
 
 179 See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/4UZP-UXFT; Q&A: DHS Implementation of the Executive Order on En-
hancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY 
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/ECT6-376X. 
 180 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), 
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 181 See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015); Galarza v. Szalczyk, 
745 F.3d 634 (3rd Cir. 2014). 
 182 Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Ka-
rol V. Mason, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 31, 2016), 
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status of individuals with DHS.183 The U.S. Department of Justice, Office 
of Justice Programs (“OJP”) concluded that the authorizing legislation for 
the Byrne and Jobs for America’s Graduates (“JAG”) grant programs re-
quires the grant recipients to certify their compliance with the “authoriz-
ing legislation and all other applicable federal laws,” including 8 U.S.C 
§ 1373.184 The OJP further stated that noncompliant programs must take 
steps to become compliant; the failure to comply could result in “the with-
holding of grant funds or ineligibility for future OJP grants or subgrants, 
suspension or termination of the grant, or other administrative, civil, or 
criminal penalties, as appropriate.”185 
One of the largest challenges to sanctuary policies thus far has been 
President Trump’s executive order released on January 25, 2017 dealing 
with immigration enforcement.186 During his candidacy, President Don-
ald Trump pledged to do away with all federal funding for sanctuary cit-
ies.187 Not even a week into his presidency, President Trump signed the 
executive order “Enhancing Public Safety in The Interior of the United 
States” which, among other things, sought to cut off federal funding from 
cities and states with santuary policies.188 The executive order gave the 
DHS Secretary the authority to designate a jurisdiction as a sanctuary ju-
risdiction.189 The significance of this tool bestowed upon the Secretary is 
that the executive order failed to give basic instructions on how such a 
designation would occur, when it could occur, and on what basis. The 
executive order also failed to instruct localities on how they could refute 
such a designation and prevent funds from being withdrawn. This provi-
sion is particularly troubling given the experience of states, such as Geor-
gia, which have sought to go after localities thought to have sanctuary 
policies, and have used questionable tactics. The executive order also di-
rected the U.S. Attorney General to “take appropriate enforcement action 
against any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. 1373, or which has in effect a 
statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of 
Federal law.”190 Furthermore, the order directed the Director of the Office 
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of Management and Budget “to obtain and provide relevant and respon-
sive information on all Federal grant money that currently is received by 
any sanctuary jurisdiction.”191 Already, the Miami-Dade County Com-
mission in Florida, for fear of losing federal funding, voted to end the 
county’s sanctuary status.192 Since then, the U.S. Department of Justice 
has issued a determination that Miami-Dade is no longer designated as a 
sanctuary city.193 
Aside from cutting off access to grants, lawsuits are another tool that 
President Trump could employ to target and punish sanctuary cities.194 
Even going beyond diminishing santuary policies, the executive order di-
rected the U.S. Attorney General to take immediate action to develop new 
287(g) agreements.195 These steps will likely result in the erosion of com-
munity trust as such agreements have done in the past, as discussed in 
Section III. 
Nonetheless, sanctuary policies remain a valid option in the wake of 
federal anti-sanctuary policies. Many cities and counties have spoken up 
against the Trump administration’s plan to increasingly use state and local 
law officials to enforce immigration laws, such as New York and Chi-
cago.196 By 2017, five state had enacted statewide policies to limit coop-
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eration with ICE and/or disallow the use of state resources for immigrai-
ton enforcement (California, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Washington).197 
Indeed, many cities have challenged Trump’s executive order both polit-
ically and judicially; the cities of San Francisco, Santa Clara, Seattle, 
Richmond, Lawrence, Chelsea, and Los Angeles have either sued the 
Trump Administration in federal court or have announced plans to do 
so.198 
On November 20, 2017, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California granted San Francisco and Santa Clara a 
nation-wide permanent injunction staying the anti-sanctuary provisions 
of the executive order.199 As the injunction applied nationally, the cases 
brought by other cities have also been stayed. 
In Miami-Dade, an individual secured release through a writ of ha-
beas corpus when a judge determined that he was detained as a direct 
result of the President’s executive order.200 In this order, which was issued 
before the Northern California injunction, the judge followed an analo-
gous path of reasoning that concluded that federal coercion of local law 
enforcement through threats of pulling grants was a violation of the Tenth 
Amendment.201 The Trump administration has appealed the decision to 
the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, where it is currently pending.202 
The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the federal 
government from commandeering states and localities to perform certain 
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acts.203 Furthermore, sanctuary policies can be crafted in such a way as to 
avoid violating 8 U.S.C. § 1373.204 
B. National Legislation: House Bill 83 
Sanctuary policies faced opposition at the federal level in 2015.205 
The murder of Kate Steinle, a young woman from California, in the sum-
mer of 2015 by Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, an undocumented immi-
grant,206 catalyzed U.S. House Republicans to promulgate a bill that 
would have stripped certain federal funding from local governments that 
ignored ICE detainers.207 Prior to the murder, a San Francisco sheriff had 
released Lopez-Sanchez after an old marijuana charge against him was 
dropped, despite a detainer request from ICE.208 The bill was targeted at 
preventing sanctuary policies like the one implemented in San Fran-
cisco.209 The bill passed the House by a vote of 241-179.210 Law enforce-
ment organizations opposed the bill for fear that undocumented immi-
grants would become less willing to trust the police and, thus, the bill 
would decrease the effectiveness of law enforcement.211 Religious leaders 
also wrote op-eds in opposition to the bill, decrying anti-sanctuary poli-
cies as immoral and unjust and calling for immigration reform that mends 
the negative effects of current policy instead of condemning immi-
grants.212 The opposition, as well as a veto threat from the White House, 
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proved effective, and Democrats in the Senate blocked passage of the 
bill.213 
House Republicans have most recently introduced the Mobilizing 
Against Sanctuary Cities Act.214 The Act215 would allow the Attorney 
General to identify the states and localities in violation of Section 1373 of 
the Unites States Code.216 The cities identified by the Attorney General 
would be ineligible for federal funding for at least one year and until the 
Attorney General certifies that they are in compliance with Section 
1373.217 Nevertheless, this bill, if enacted as law, would have run up 
against the same legal challenges that are being mounted against the ex-
ecutive branch’s efforts to eliminate sanctuary policies, as discussed 
above. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to make clear the consequences of forced state 
and local involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration policy 
and how sanctuary policies can be an effective tool in combating these 
consequences. The attempts of the federal government and states, such as 
Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, to coerce localities into cooperat-
ing with ICE will exacerbate budget constraints, expose localities to civil 
liability, and result in unconstitutional policing. Additionally, if Georgia’s 
experience with the IERB is any indication of what is to come with the 
federal crackdown on localities with sanctuary policies, many localities 
across the nation could be facing costly battles to maintain these policies 
that foster community trust and reduce civil liability of localities. Further-
more, Secure Communities and PEP have led to the separation of fami-
lies, resulting in reduction in community trust. Any such effort risks di-
minishing trust between law enforcement and immigrant communities 
and alienating immigrants from cooperating with the local police. 
For the state government to take on the regulation of immigration 
policies, an issue in the federal arena, in such an involved way results in 
taking away limited local resources from essential state functions. The 
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return of Secure Communities and 287(g) will break down efforts at com-
munity policing and could result in increased reliance on policing prac-
tices that open the door to racial profiling. Immigrants will be discouraged 
from reporting crime, therefore making communities less safe. 
Finally, sanctuary cities are in danger of being swept away by anti-
sanctuary legislation on the federal and state level, in addition to federal 
executive branch policy. The 2017 executive orders and implementation 
memos threaten to pressure sanctuary communities into nonexistence. 
The memos single out jurisdictions that do not honor detainers, and the 
executive orders promise to strip federal funding from jurisdictions that 
adopt policies that limit communication with ICE. Anti-immigrant and 
anti-sanctuary legislation at the state and local levels have proven to be 
detrimental to local economies, caused increased risk of exposure to civil 
liability for localities, and diminished community safety. Communities 
choose to adopt sanctuary policies in order to minimize the negative con-
sequences of federal policies such as detainers. The continued adoption 
of sanctuary policies is necessary to avoid the negative consequences of 
anti-sanctuary state provisions of state laws. Nevertheless, as of this arti-
cle’s publication date, the legal challenges brought against the executive 
branch’s attempts to limit sanctuary policies were promising. 
Community groups can still play a large role in shaping policy, de-
spite the state and federal efforts to attack and eliminate sanctuary poli-
cies. Community groups can continue to urge localities to adopt sanctuary 
policies that are compliant with anti-sanctuary laws, as seen in Georgia or 
Alabama. Additionally, community groups can continue to bring lawsuits 
challenging the legality of detainers in their respective jurisdictions. Fi-
nally, community groups can bring legal challenges to prolonged deten-
tion at police stops and prolonged arrest. 
For the reasons stated above, state legislatures and congress must 
avoid passing anti-sanctuary legislation. Instead, this article recommends 
that localities adopt policies that foster community trust in order to better 
protect their immigrant communities from abuse and to eliminate civil 
liability related to unconstitutional practices, such as the honoring of ICE 
detainers. 
